INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the accuracy of the U.S. official forecasts of real growth and inflation from 1976 to 1990 for the Group of Seven Just under half of the forecast errors were of a different sign from the errors of the preceding year.
The Federal Reserve "Greenbook" is a document distributed to top level staff and Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members shortly before each FOMC meeting. The FOMC is the primary policymaking arm of the Federal Reserve. Greenbook information is classified for five years following each FOMC meeting.
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The number of sign reversals of forecast error ranged from four for Japan to nine for Canada. 4
As was true for other forecasters, the 
Administration Inflation Forecasts
The Administration forecast errors for inflation in the G-7 nations are shown in figure 2;6 table 2 presents the summary statistics with respect to the 6 The large error in the forecast of U.K. inflation in 1978 is attributable primarily to a decline in inflation in 1978; inflation fell from 15.9 percent in 1977 to 8.3 percent in 1978. It rose to 13.4 percent in 1979. During 1978, there were price controls in force on some components of the CPI market basket, and, at government urging, unions moderated their wage demands. In 1979, with the election of a Conservative government, the unions returned to noholds-barred wage bargaining, and the government not only removed price controls, it increased the rate of value-added tax applicable to several items in the CPI market basket, boosting inflation during that year. 8 Errors in one direction were followed by errors in the other direction about a third of the time-less than was the case for real growth. The number of reversals of sign of the forecast error ranged from three for Japan to six for both France and the United Kingdom. 9
We have looked at whether the Administration forecasting record was better when growth and inflation were rising than when they were falling.' 0
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' The Administration forecasts of U.S. inflation in 1979 and 1980 pertained to the GNP deflator rather than the CPI. Hence, for these two years, the forecast errors are calculated with respect to the change in that measure rather than the CPI. Japan's compounded annual rate of inflation between 1976 and 1990 was 3.1 percent, second among the G-7 nations to West Germany's 3.0 percent.
Once again, a zero erràr is not counted as a change in sign.
If an accurate prediction were counted as a sign change, Canada would join the United Kingdom and France with six year-to-year sign changes.
Note that the focus here is on whether the growth or inflation rate is algebraically greater than or less than that during the previous year.
Thus, a change in a growth or inflation rate from a positive number to a smaller positive number is counted as a fall in the rate while a change from a negative number to a smaller negative number is counted as a rise in the rate.
The RNSE of the Administration's forecasts of economic growth in the G-7 nations taken as a whole was more than one third larger for the periods when growth fell than when it rose.
In contrast, the RNSE of the Administration's inflation forecasts for the G-7 nations taken together was lower when inflation was falling than when it was rising. " There were two cases in which economic growth was unchanged from the previous year. West German economic growth in 1986 was 2.5 percent, equal to the 1985 figure; U.K. growth in 1988 was 4.2 percent, equal to the 1987 number.
COMPARISONS TO ALTERNATIVE PREDICTIONS
There was also one instance of an unchanged inflation rate.
The U.S. inflation rate in 1977 was 5.8 percent, equal to the 1976 rate. These observations have been deleted from the analysis of "up versus down" forecasting errors.
12 DRI forecasts of economic growth and inflation for all the G-7 countries are available over the period 1983-90. The summary statistics pertaining to these DRI forecasts are compared to those of the Administration's forecasts over the same period in the appendix. Generally the DRI forecasts over this evaluation period were somewhat more accurate than the Administration forecasts.
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The OECD makes several assumptions about members' economies in projecting each nation's economic growth. The organization assumes that the exchange rate of the nation's currency during a year remains at the level of November in the previous year (the month the projections are prepared), that fiscal policy will remain unchanged and that the real oil price (the price of oil relative to that of OECD exports of manufactures) will remain constant. The reasoning behind these assumptions is that the OECD is "advising" its member governments where they are headed economically if they continue to pursue current policies-not predicting the nations' economic futures. Hence, the OECD considers its product a projection To what might one attribute the greater accuracy of the OECD outlooks compared with the Administration's forecasts? One factor might be that OECD projections of growth in the G-7 nations were made closer to the beginning of the forecast year.
The OECD might also be in a better position in closely following the economic performance of many nations to take into account worldwide influences than is the Administration whose forecasts are largely dependent on inputs from individual countries. On the other hand, the OECD procedure simply assumes unchanged fiscal policies, exchange rates and real oil prices, which might be a factor that would lead to less accuracy in their predictions if it were true that such factors have a predictable effect on growth and inflation.
In sum, we don't have an explanation for the difference.
In any event, for each G-7 nation except Italy, the sum of squared errors of the OECD projection is smaller than that for the Administration forecast errors. Moreover, while the Administration's squared rather than a forecast. 14 Peter Jarrett of the OECD's U.S. desk offered two explanations of the overall downward bias of the organization's projections:
(1) The period covered by this study has generally been marked by economic expansion in the G-7 nations, and its failure to '~For the U.S. inflation rate, the forecast observations deleted from the Treasury and Blue Chip forecasts were those pertaining to 1986, which were 2.3 and 2.1 percentage points, respectively. The observation deleted from the DRI forecast was that for 1980, which was -3.9 percentage points.
For the Federal Reserve, the largest error was either -1.6 (1990) or 1.6 (1986). Which one is deleted is important only for the bias measure, as noted in table 8. For the Canadian inflation rate, the forecast observations deleted from the Treasury and DRI forecasts were those for 1984 and 1981, respectively, which were 2.1 and -2.0 percentage points. The Treasury thought the Council's forecast of U.S. economic growth in 1983 was too high and substituted the Blue Chip consensus forecast.
(As it turned out, the Treasury-i.e., Blue Chip-forecast was also too high, but not so high as the Council's.) of that firm's staff. The OECD projections are Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data are frequently revised. It was necessary to choose a fixed target to which to compare the forecasts. What we did was to use the Treasury Department's historical data, which it provided along with its forecasts in each issue of the WEO.
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The OECD focuses on year-on-year growth rates. Since the OECD uses the personal consumption deflator (rather than the consumer price index) as its measure of inflation, its inflation projections are not considered here. 21 The dates of the Administration forecasts for the next year range from September through December of the previous year.
Generally, historical data on GNP or GNP changes for a particular year continue to appear in the~1~Qfor about 18 months following the end of that year.
The last historical citation of the annual change in national GNP or GDP appearing in the 3~Qis the outcome to which the forecasts are compared. 22
Although Consumer Price Index (CPI) data tend not to be revised after they are issued, a similar procedure has been followed in selecting the inflation data with which to compare the forecasts. 22 In 1986 Canada changed the emphasis in its National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) from GNP to GDP and stopped explicitly reporting historical real GNP data in its official bulletin, National Income and ExDenditure Accounts (NIEA) . When the Canadian NIPA focus shifted, the Administration began to forecast GDP instead of GNP for Canada and reported historical GDP data in the WEO. Since the 1985 and 1986 growth forecasts for Canada prepared b'~' the Administration pertained to GNP, it was necessary to obtain real GNP growth data for 1985 and 1986 with which to compare the forecasts.
23 The Administration's 1980 inflation forecast for the United States, which appeared in the September 1979~Q, pertained to the GNP deflator rather than the CPI. The deflator calculated on the basis of data appearing in the 1981 IFS yearbook was used to test the accuracy of this forecast.
(Given the Administration data, the September 1979 DRI and Blue Chip forecasts of the increase in the U.S. GNP deflator-rather than CPI inflation-are employed in this comparison.) .5
. 7 1975 1978 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 NOTE: For 1979 and 1980, the Administration inflation forecast pertained to the GNP deflator; for all other years, the forecast pertained to the consumer price index. Hence, 1979 and 1980 DRI and 1980 Blue Chip forecasts pertain to the deflator. 
